

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY IN IRAQ

by

Colonel Clarence D. Turner
United States Army

Professor John F. Troxell
Project Adviser

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CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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The reconstruction strategy in Iraq was built on an assumption that a secure and safe environment was going to prevail throughout most of the rebuilding effort; the ongoing insurgencies and sectarian violence have clearly toppled that assumption. Indeed, it will take some strategic patience for the security situation to develop sufficiently so that a full-scale reconstruction effort can take root. In the interim, military formations can “bridge the gap” through the bottom-up Commander's Emergency Response Program. Restoration of essential services, if tied to the national reconstruction strategy, can provide stepping stones towards rebuilding a nation-state. This strategy research project introduces a reconstruction strategy formulation model (RSFM) that civilian leaders and military commanders can use to design a strategy to put the local indigenous population immediately to work towards rebuilding their local communities, while simultaneously keeping the national reconstruction effort at the forefront. The RSFM emphasizes a full spectrum bottom-up “effects-based” approach with “connective tissue” throughout all operational phases that encompasses local, state/province, and national reconstruction projects. This approach sets the conditions for transferring the reconstruction effort to civilian control by incorporating the reconstruction effort holistically throughout the operational campaign.

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY IN IRAQ

... to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

—President George W. Bush

There have been two strategic approaches to reconstruction in Iraq, top-down and bottom-up. The U.S. government began with a top-down, pre-war reconstruction strategy, but this strategy was premature and under-resourced. It was built on an assumption that a secure and safe environment was going to prevail throughout most of the rebuilding effort. Indeed, it will take some strategic patience for the security situation to develop sufficiently so that a full-scale reconstruction effort can take root. Bottom-up local reconstruction efforts by U.S. military forces before, during, or following conflict or civil strife can “bridge the gap” between the immediate operational situation and top-down nation-wide reconstruction efforts.

The top-down approach focuses on nation-wide strategic reconstruction efforts to rebuild a nation-state, planned from the national perspective. Top-down projects focus on rebuilding some of the same types of infrastructure as bottom-up projects, such as schools, clinics, hospitals, and roads. But top-down projects are conceived from a broader economical, social and political perspective. In Iraq, reconstruction organizations were formed and operated fairly independently from the activities conducted by the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander. During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)-II, the Gulf Region Division (GRD) Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers collaborated with the MNF-I Commander, the U.S. Ambassador, and the Project and Contracting Office to connect prioritized national construction missions with the success of the tactical and operational commanders. GRD placed Area Engineer Offices in the Forward Operating Bases (FOB) in order to integrate the national construction projects with the tactical and operational projects.¹

The bottom-up approach, on the other hand, focuses on local tactical and operational reconstruction efforts to rebuild a nation-state by providing the initial tangible evidence of implementation of a national plan. Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, military forces in Iraq supported the tactical and operational commanders through the execution of local reconstruction projects through the use of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).

This SRP originated with my practical experience as an engineer battalion commander in OIF I.² It also draws upon various U.S. reconstruction policies and strategies currently

employed in Afghanistan and Iraq. In today's strategic environment, in which there is no clear demarcation between major combat and post-conflict operations, strategic planners and operators must address the need for restoring infrastructure across the full spectrum of warfare. As Tim Pritchard pointed out in the *New York Times* preview of the Iraqi Study Group (ISG) report, the problem with the ISG's anticipated reconstruction analysis is their tendency to treat the invasion and the post-invasion as two separate events. That is, the U.S.-led invasion is generally portrayed as well planned and executed, while the post-invasion strategy is characterized as poorly planned and undermanned. But Pritchard points out that the short fight to get Baghdad and the long one in which coalition forces have been fighting ever since have much in common.³ In OIF, we are facing a unique mission of rebuilding Iraq in the midst of an insurgency and related sectarian violence.

Restoration of essential services at the tactical and operational level, if tied to the national reconstruction strategy, can provide stepping stones towards rebuilding a nation-state. This strategy research project (SRP) develops a reconstruction strategy formulation model (RSFM) that civilian leaders and military commanders can use to put the local indigenous population immediately to work towards rebuilding their local communities, while simultaneously keeping the national reconstruction effort at the forefront. The RSFM emphasizes a full spectrum bottom-up "effects-based" approach with "connective tissue" between and among operational phases and between and among local, state/province, and national reconstruction projects. This approach sets the conditions for transferring the reconstruction effort to civilian control by incorporating the reconstruction effort holistically throughout the operational campaign.

Background

Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, dated 28 November 2005, provides guidance on stability operations and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.⁴ This directive also emphasizes the following tasks: "... security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks."⁵

After nearly five years, the U.S.-led piecemeal approach to reconstruction of Iraq is falling short of the desired political aims.⁶ U.S. political aims for the reconstruction of Iraq focused on building a free and democratic government with the capacity to deliver essential services.⁷ According to Field Manual (FM) 3-24, the Army's *Counterinsurgency Manual*, essential services

are defined as: security, water, electricity, academics, transportation networks, medical services, and sanitation.⁸ The planned post-Saddam Iraq top-down reconstruction strategy assumed a permissive security and political environment— an environment that was conducive for full-scale reconstruction. According to William Flavin in *Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success*, “Another reality is that the objective and end state selected at the start of a conflict most likely will be altered as the conflict proceeds and may not be the same at termination.”⁹ Indeed the assumed permissive security and political environment in Iraq did not emerge at the conclusion of major combat operations. The security situation shifted after the Jordanian Embassy Bombing in August 2003. “Violence returned to the streets of Baghdad with a vengeance yesterday when at least 11 people were killed in a massive car bomb explosion outside the Jordanian embassy, leading to fears that [insurgent] fighters may now be turning their attention towards so-called soft targets,” reported Jamie Wilson in the *Guardian*.¹⁰ A February 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, *Rebuilding Iraq, Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financial Challenges*, concluded that security is one of the three main pillars for rebuilding Iraq.¹¹

The political situation in Iraq has evolved over the past four years. Initially, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was responsible for Iraq’s post-conflict reconstruction, with the immediate responsibility for execution oversight assigned to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). ORHA was designed to deploy to Iraq and plug in smoothly to CENTCOM operations.¹² Within two months, OHRA was replaced by the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA). The CPA assumed executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA’s establishment on 21 April 2003 until its dissolution on 28 June 2004, and was responsible for Iraq’s top-down reconstruction efforts. Its first two decisions, de-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi military and police force, greatly complicated the reconstruction mission.¹³ Although there is no clear proof that disbanding the former Iraqi security forces contributed to current unrest in Iraq, it is clear that instability can minimize the overall effects of the reconstruction effort.

After the fall of Baghdad, coalition forces used the Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Recovery Program (BCDRP), which became the Commander’s Emergency Response Plan (CERP), to fund bottom-up projects carried out by local indigenous workers. CERP supported reconstruction projects throughout Iraq. Properly planned, they can provide strategic connective tissues for top-down projects such as major infrastructure repairs. According to Captain Daniel Cederman, who is currently deployed in Iraq, “Our primary source [for bottom-up reconstruction] funding is still CERP.”¹⁴ As stability matures within a theater of operations, U.S. military forces,

even while conducting military operations, can put the local indigenous population to work through CERP by reconstructing essential services from the bottom-up, and potentially taking them away from insurgent recruiters. Writing in the *Military Review*, Major General Chiarelli and Major Michaelis reported that "... within 72 hours of a cease-fire being implemented, [filling] over 22,000 jobs oriented on local infrastructure repair within the most lacking areas of the city that correlated to the power base of Mutada [al-Sadr's] lieutenants. ... took away the power base from the insurgents."¹⁵

Strategic Environment

U.S. armed forces will likely remain engaged in [Afghanistan] and [Iraq] for the foreseeable future. They will also need to remain involved in deterrence missions in the Western Pacific, most notably in regard to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. The United States will wish to remain strongly engaged in European security as well, less because of threats to the region than because most of America's main security partners are located there.¹⁶

Much has been written about the 21st-century strategic security environment, aptly described as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA). Terrorist violence from non-state actors such as al Qaeda and conflicts between states and within states have become part of this century's global landscape. This is clearly a paradigm shift from the Cold War "face off" between two superpowers. However, radical ideologues and rogue nations and non state-actors will continue to look for ways to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and undermine its foreign policies. The U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) calls upon America's armed forces to sustain U.S. leadership in a global community that is challenged on many fronts. This strategy requires us to consider the threat of global terrorism and to foster democracies while sustaining our ability to fight a more conventional enemy. The NMS specifies three characteristics of the security environment: (1) a wider range of adversaries, (2) a more complex and distributed battle space, and (3) more diffused and accessible technology.¹⁷ Civil-military reconstruction efforts will take place in this dangerous environment to either deter conflict or to rebuild nations during or following a conflict.

Swift defeats such as the relatively rapid and successful march to Baghdad, impose unique problems in reconstruction. It takes a safe and secure environment and considerable time to bring in contractors to complete major infrastructure projects. Top-down nation-wide reconstruction efforts simply cannot neglect the security environment. Civilian organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign contractors are reluctant to perform reconstruction tasks in an unstable environment. Conrad Crane, author of FM 3-34, the Army's *Counterinsurgency Manual* notes that: "In the past, U.S. commanders often conducted detailed

planning for Phase IV while Phase III was ongoing, such as during WW II. But ... with Rapid Decisive Operations and schemes of maneuver designed to speedily defeat adversaries, such an approach is no longer feasible.”¹⁸ Thus, post-conflict tasks must be strategically planned early on, and their execution should begin early in the conflict. The ISG stated that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations should focus on a strategy of “clear, hold, and build”—“clearing” areas of insurgents and death squads, “holding” those areas with Iraqi security forces, and “building” areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects.¹⁹ According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “[It is] an issue that [I have] felt strongly about from the beginning - that the reconstruction and economic development part of this strategy of clear, hold and build are critically important to its long-term success.”²⁰

Reconstruction Policies and Directives

To address the current security threat, the 2006 National Security Strategy mentions development of civilian and international military capabilities for “post-conflict” operations. National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) and DoD Directive 3000.05 formalized the U.S. civil-military policy on reconstruction. S/CRS authorizes the U.S. Government (USG) lead for NSPD-44 implementation. U.S. State Department’s responsibilities cited in NSPD-44 are as follows: coordinate, integrate, and strengthen USG efforts for reconstruction, ensure interagency (IA) approach to reconstruction, and harmonize military and civilian efforts. Other USG agencies provide resources and information to S/CRS on their current capabilities.²¹ Executing reconstruction in today’s security environment requires a paradigm shift – a proper balance between combat operations and Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO). For example, DoD Directive 3000.05 equates stabilization and combat operations.²² Based on analysis of NSPD-44 and DoD Directive 3000.05, the ends, ways, and means of reconstruction operations can be construed as follows:

Ends: Promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.²³

Ways:

- Build domestic, international, and coalition support.
- Establish U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic aid for failing or failed states.
- Establish interagency working groups within an integrated U.S. reconstruction and stabilization effort.
- Integrate reconstruction early-on in the military campaign plans.

- Coordinate reconstruction strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private sector entities.
- Build a strong civilian response capability.
- Identify lessons learned and integrate them into current and future operations.

Means:

- Will and support of the American people.
- The full use of the Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic-Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement (DIME-FIL) model.
- International and coalition support.
- Non-governmental agencies.

An assessment of the U.S. government's current approach to reconstruction reveals several concerns. These policies are not *feasible* with the current resourcing. Better coordination with the IA, especially during the transition of the reconstruction from military to civilian control, is required. Currently, there are few civilian/IA organizations that can deploy and carry out SSTRO. For example, to what civilian organization does the military transfer a specific joint line of operation? Civilian authorities are also under-resourced to assume the reconstruction mission from the military. These policies are politically *acceptable*; however, in order to execute future conflicts, legislation is required beforehand to fund essential projects. Although *suitable* for future conflicts, this approach will require unprecedented support within the USG interagency. Regarding risks, failure to execute an effective reconstruction plan can potentially protract post-conflict operations and may even lead to mission failure. Second-order and third-order effects are insurgencies, poor economic growth, and regional instability. Executing a nation-state reconstruction strategy requires long-term commitment of American means, with considerable inherent risks.

Reconstruction

The U.S. has been involved in reconstruction (nation-building) operations for the past two centuries. According to Crane and Andrew Terrill, however, in recent decades U.S. civilian and military leaders have advised against large-scale reconstruction, especially "nation-building."²⁴ Yet today, reconstruction has become a main pillar in the U.S. security strategy.²⁵

According to the Association of the United States Army Torchbearer Report, in an era of uncertainty, unpredictability, misinformation, and misconceptions, U.S. military capabilities cannot single-handedly provide the order and stability necessary for states and regions to recover and reestablish themselves.²⁶ Civilian activities and capabilities such as diplomacy and

financial incentives and disincentives are also vital to addressing the full range of challenges created by this new security environment. The U.S. interagency community's pre-conflict planning and training are important parts of reconstruction. U.S. planning for post-war Iraq took place in an interagency process that involved government officials from the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Commerce, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Central Intelligence Agency, and representatives from the staffs of the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.²⁷ But this impressive interagency team fell short in their planning effort. Since the U.S.-led invasion into Iraq, several thousand reconstruction projects have been financed and completed with American tax dollars and civilian and military efforts, but many reconstruction accomplishments have been muffled in the ongoing secular violence and insurgency. Further, ongoing public debate and Congressional hearings on the OIF post-conflict troop strength continuously overshadows the Iraq reconstruction effort.

Until now, the interagency community has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating tools and relationships each time a crisis arises.²⁸ On 5 August 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to enhance our nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, or post-conflict states and similar complex emergencies.²⁹ S/CRS developed a "working-in-progress" comprehensive Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks List (PRETL). The PRETL was developed through an interagency working group led by the U.S. State Department; it serves as a post-conflict planning tool. This comprehensive task list provides the necessary benchmarks to track reconstruction, but it does not address key tasks, such as infrastructure assessments and reconstruction shaping that can take place in earlier phases.³⁰ However, the PRETL is a tremendous leap forward in the interagency planning process for post-conflict operations. The USG interagency must continue to build on this concept.

Congress has approved a series of supplemental appropriations for both the Afghanistan and Iraq reconstruction efforts— something like a Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan has been recognized as a great U.S. humanitarian effort to enable the world, especially Europe, to recover from the ravages of World War II.³¹ Rowan Scarborough from the *Washington Times* claims that "Most Americans do not understand something equivalent to the Marshall Plan has been accomplished in Iraq."³² Following WW II, the U.S. was concerned about the expansion of communism and the rapid deterioration of European economies in the winter of 1946-47, so Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948 and approved funding to rebuild

Western Europe. Following 9/11, the U.S. was concerned about the expansion of radical ideologies that breed generations of hostile actors that can deteriorate Middle Eastern economies for decades to come. In OIF, the U.S. cut off the head of the Iraqi state, but the body did not quickly regenerate into a legitimate government for various reasons. When this happens, someone fills the vacuum—such as insurgents. For example, Mutada al-Sadr began providing essential services to residents within Sadr City, as noted in the Chiarelli article. He gained legitimacy with the local population from the bottom-up, but his activities did not support the U.S. goal of a more unified and stable Iraq.

The Iraq reconstruction effort is equivalent to the Marshall Plan in concept, but certain unique characteristics affect Iraq, such as culture and politics. In Iraq and other potential regions of instability, many other factors are critical to the reconstruction effort than those in post-war Europe. Stability is a paramount requirement for reconstruction. Instability delays reconstruction and perpetuates conflict, as seen in Iraq today. Additionally, pockets of instability may distress an otherwise stable nation, as seen in the activities of Lebanon's Hezbollah party. The culture and political environment in Iraq are different from those in Western Europe, and these factors should be addressed in planning future reconstruction efforts. For example, some cultures have great potential for sectarian violence because of historic tensions within their cultures, while others have no such volatile potential. Some countries have secular governments and some do not. Furthermore, we can take tremendous advantage of intelligence resources to shape the reconstruction effort throughout the operational campaign. As military forces conduct their patrols, they can provide valuable human intelligence for the overall stabilization and reconstruction effort. What effects are the insurgents having on the reconstruction effort? What are the essential services that need immediate attention? The U.S. must remain cognizant of post-conflict "wildcards" that may evolve, such as the 22 February 2006 Shiite Mosque bombing, and then adjust policy and strategy accordingly.³³ Finally, effects-based reconstruction efforts must involve the indigenous people.

Executing Reconstruction In Iraq

Recall that the basic strategic approaches are top-down and bottom-up. The top-down strategy relies primarily on major infrastructure projects. Bottom-up strategy, on the other hand, relies on the local commander's initiative, which is embedded in CERP. The provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) bridge between these two strategy approaches by linking national programs to local efforts to rebuild a nation-state. Recall that the GRD commander linked

national projects to local projects by placing an area engineer in the FOBs. PRTs thus link local projects to regional and national projects.³⁴

Massive Infrastructure Projects (MIP)

Most reconstruction efforts in Iraq have focused on rebuilding major infrastructure from the top-down. According to a *Wall Street Journal* report, U.S.-funded reconstruction projects in Iraq have largely failed to restore the country's electricity output, water supply, or sewage capabilities to prewar levels. The expensive effort to rebuild Iraq's war-shattered infrastructure has been mired in controversy from the very beginning because most of the money went to large American contractors, rather than to smaller indigenous firms.³⁵ Even before the invasion of Iraq, several U.S. companies prepared to come into Iraq and restore essential services, such as "rebuilding power generation facilities, electrical grids, water, and sewage systems and airport facilities in Iraq."³⁶ These companies brought tremendous capability into theater for top-down level projects, but they did not rapidly produce jobs for the local population. Large construction companies also faced security issues that impeded their ability to fully execute their projects. As mentioned earlier, effective reconstruction depends on security. During combat operations, not a lot of "mom and pop" indigenous construction companies are available to do work. They take longer to rebuild and to develop enough confidence in the stability and security of the environment to start working again. In the meantime, we are mostly obligated to those—that can do the work—big construction companies with huge security costs.³⁷ Nonetheless, in Iraq U.S. forces were able to put some of the smaller local indigenous firms to work through the use of CERP, a bottom-up effects-based resource.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

The Provincial Reconstruction Team initiative is a civil-military effort that is becoming the primary interface between U.S. and Coalition partners and provincial governments throughout Iraq. The PRT program is in direct support of the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq."³⁸

PRTs emerged in Afghanistan as a U.S. initiative in early 2003. Through close coordination with other Coalition nations, the PRT program evolved into a network of 13 teams by the end of June 2004.³⁹ PRTs provide a model for civil-military cooperation, and represent interagency organizations that function at the provincial level.⁴⁰ These teams are built on an embedded interagency platform that is designed to facilitate the transfer of the reconstruction efforts to civilian control. PRTs were established in Afghanistan to meet three objectives: to improve security, to extend the operational reach of the Afghanistan government, and to

facilitate reconstruction in selected provinces.⁴¹ The PRTs were designed to sustain security and provide civil and governmental institutions with more stability in remote regions. DoD was responsible for security, USAID for reconstruction, and the U.S. State Department for political oversight. PRTs effectively extend the political reach of the central Afghanistan government by providing technical and organizational support to governors and provincial ministries. They also deliver critical reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to areas where no other actors have been able or willing to operate.⁴²

The USG introduced PRTs in Iraq as a centerpiece of the U.S. counterinsurgency drive. According to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, “The first PRT, in Ninawa Province, was inaugurated during the visit of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on November 11, 2005.”⁴³ Currently, there are 10 PRTs in Iraq with plans to increase to at least 18 PRTs.⁴⁴ An October 2006 inspector general special report for Iraq reconstruction cites several shortfalls with PRTs in Iraq: escalating violence, severe funding shortfalls, and problems recruiting civilians from other countries willing to work in Iraq. Security has surely reduced the PRTs’ overall effectiveness in Iraq.⁴⁵ For example, according to the DoD Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “PRTs are most appropriate in a mid-range of violence where instability still precludes heavy nongovernmental organization (NGO) involvement, but where violence is not so acute that combat operations predominate.”⁴⁶

Other problems, such as insufficient resources and inadequate command and control, have also hampered the process. According to Stephen Biddle, in Iraq PRTs lack unity of effort: “The Pentagon and State Department cannot spell out who is in charge of PRTs, who they answer to and who provides logistical support on the ground.”⁴⁷

However, in theory and in best practice, PRTs provide an effects-based resource with tremendous potential well beyond Iraq. Modular PRTs are the way ahead. For example, once the security situation stabilizes, the civilian component of the PRT can assume more responsibility and move towards establishing the local government, then the military component can drawdown. PRTs use CERP as a means to accomplish some of their projects. Military forces executing CERP from the bottom-up can thus fill the PRT gap.

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

The keys to successful conflict termination include the following fundamentals: conducting early interagency planning; establishing workable objectives, goals, and endstate; ...ensuring unity of effort; harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and establishing the appropriate post-conflict organization.⁴⁸

U.S. Army FM 3-24 affirms that “CERP is not a standing program,”⁴⁹ so similar legislation (means) will be necessary for future post-conflicts. However, civilian leaders and tactical commanders need to be trained on the implementation of CERP to ensure that U.S. forces can gain the favor and good will of the populace in a military operation.⁵⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Mark Martin, Deputy Legal Counsel, Joint Staff, conducted a detailed study on the effectiveness of CERP in Iraq. The Commander of Combined-Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) implemented the CERP by issuing Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 89, which authorized:

the building, repair, reconstruction, and reestablishment of the social and material infrastructure in Iraq. This includes but is not limited to: water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, healthcare, education, telecommunications, projects in furtherance of economic, financial, management improvements, transportation and initiatives which further restore the rule of law and effective governance, irrigation systems installation or restoration, day laborers to perform civic cleaning, purchase or repair of civic support vehicles, and repairs to civic or cultural facilities.⁵¹

U.S. forces then used CERP to employ day laborers, which took them away from potential insurgent activities. PRTs employ CERP at the provincial level, whereas the military application of CERP comes primarily at the local level. The CERP program vitally enhanced the military’s ability to immediately restore the local populations’ degraded infrastructure, even during the conflict. Often CERP projects yield unnoticed strategic effects that can jump-start future post conflict operations. The 14th CEB moved to Camp Speicher, just north of Tikrit, Iraq, in April 2003. Within a week of their arrival, they repaired a water treatment plant in a town just north of Tikrit. This project was carried out “below the noise level”; it was completed with cooperation of the local community and the unit on the ground. It was funded with captured Iraqi cash. This early CERP success demonstrated that relatively small amounts of money spent locally and intelligently by commanders can yield significant strategic effects.⁵² Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Risch, former Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Infantry Division, Tikrit, Iraq stated that CERP was used non-kinetically as an effects-based approach to coerce the leaders in the town of Samarra to abandon their insurgent activities. The leaders were offered CERP in lieu of a kinetic attack; they chose CERP.⁵³

But do CERP projects really help defeat insurgencies and terrorist organizations? Certainly they reduce the incentive to join with the local insurgency. The coalition ground forces assumed the responsibility of an occupying Army, and MIPs were slow to get started. CERP enables unit commanders to directly influence the local host-nation governments or tribes with critical infrastructure repairs. CERP gave commanders in Iraq a stabilization tool that benefited the Iraqi people.⁵⁴ The town of Al Zawiyah, just north of Bayji, had not had potable water for

over 30 years, according to the town's tribal leader. Prior to OIF, the water was trucked in daily to satisfy the town's water requirement. Upon completion of the U.S. constructed water project, an Iraqi school was renamed to honor Captain Cederman in a Sunni-dominated tribal community of Siniyah, just west of Bayji, showing the local population's appreciation of the U.S. efforts to restore Iraq.⁵⁵ Some refer to this as "winning the hearts and minds." Successful bottom-up reconstruction projects have broken through some of the Iraqi cultural bias against Americans. U.S. forces can exert some strategic effects if they have the capability, such as CERP, to immediately restore life-sustaining infrastructure during combat operations or SSTR. In early 2003, Task Force Neighborhood (TFN) Outreach Program was developed by V Corps to help Iraqis rebuild their country. This program consisted of "task forces" drawn from the coalition; they joined neighborhoods to assist with local projects and hired Iraqis to rebuild the essential services in their neighborhoods. V Corps' 130th Engineer Brigade initiated this effort.⁵⁶ Captured Iraqi cash provided the start-up funds for TFN. These bottom-up strategic initiatives can bridge the gap before MIPs and PRTs become fully operational.

Reconstruction Strategy Formulation Model

Throughout the full spectrum of warfare, a failing or failed nation-state's infrastructure and economy will vary from degraded to damaged, from primarily agrarian to primarily high-tech, and from rural (Afghanistan) to urban (Iraq)—or some combination of all these attributes. CERP provides the means for U.S. forces to rebuild institutions during the early phases of an operation. CERP relies on military/civilian cooperation and local governments to identify projects that are vital to their community and that will enhance economic stability. Our ability to quickly integrate interagency teams such as the PRTs during conflict or post-conflict will facilitate a smoother transition of reconstruction to civilian authorities. CERP and PRTs provide the means to set the conditions for transferring reconstruction to civilian control. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1.

The Full-Spectrum Bottom-up Strategy Formulation Model can be integrated into all phases and used throughout the full spectrum of warfare (see Figure 1). This model provides "connective tissue" for the reconstruction effort. For example, during Phase II, some smaller scale PRT and MIP projects are underway simultaneously with CERP, if the security situation is permissive. The bottom-up approach to reconstruction realizes the importance of executing a full spectrum approach in rebuilding a nation. This full-spectrum approach begins with shaping operations and proceeds with military use of CERP (or some other authorized funds), while

simultaneously laying the groundwork for PRT and MIP projects. CERP projects play a lesser role during the transition and reconstruction phases of SSTR.




Figure 1.

During Phases 0 and I (pre-conflict/deter), U.S. and coalition forces should perform shaping tasks that establish theater security cooperation agreements, assess the nation-state infrastructure, launch infrastructure improvements (host nation ports and airfields), and formulate regional reconstruction policy and strategy. To support these activities, the interagency should seek legislative approval for a CERP-like program. They should also identify key infrastructure that needs protecting throughout the full spectrum. During this phase, U.S. civilian and military personnel will also conduct humanitarian assistance (HA).⁵⁷ These shaping operations can enhance the overall reconstruction effort. During Phases II and III (seize and dominate phases), U.S. and coalition forces can initiate the essential reconstruction projects from the bottom-up, using CERP. PRTs and MIPs may then be undertaken if the security environment is permissive. U.S. forces must be prepared to address HA issues. PRTs and MIPs may be active if the security environment is permissive. During Phase IV (SSTR), U.S. and coalition forces should continue the essential reconstruction projects from the bottom-up using CERP. During the transition phase, PRTs become fully employed, making way for a more prominent role for the interagency in the reconstruction effort. Introducing the interagency during Phases II and III, if security situation permits, sets the conditions for a smoother transfer during post conflict operations. During the reconstruction phase, civilians take the reconstruction lead. But in large campaigns conducted in a vast area

of operations, reconstruction may take longer in one section than in another. So commanders on the ground should make critical decisions regarding the reconstruction efforts. For example, one sector may be executing more reconstruction tasks while another sector is executing more security tasks within the same theater of operations.

According to the Chairman's Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), "Additionally, the QDR recognizes [SSTR] as a U.S. government wide mission of increasing importance and identifies military support to SSTR as a core mission."⁵⁸ In SSTR, stability is initially the main effort; then over time reconstruction becomes the main effort. According to the AUSA Torchbearer, *Stability* operations manage the underlying tensions to prevent or halt reconstruction. *Security* establishes a safe and secure environment for the local population, indigenous military and civilian organizations and U.S. agencies conducting the rebuilding operations. *Transition* mainly involves shifting the lead from the U.S. military, to the U.S. civilian agencies, and then from the U.S. agencies to the indigenous governments. *Reconstruction* involves rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political and socioeconomic systems, and physical infrastructure of a nation-state.⁵⁹ Transition is singly the most complex operation; it will require a dedicated effort by the military and USG agencies. Following conflict, the military is the lead reconstruction agency, and then over time the civilian/IA organizations take the lead. This not only applies to infrastructure, but to other reconstruction tasks, such as rebuilding the government and the military.

Military forces in their sovereign capacity must execute the initial restoration of the infrastructure. Successful performance of such tasks can help secure a lasting peace, facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces, and posture a nation-state for economic growth.⁶⁰ During stability operations, employing the local indigenous workforce to rebuild the infrastructure renders them less likely to be involved in an insurgency.

Funding Reconstruction Operations

In COIN, like all operations, commands require specific authority to expend funds. In recent COIN operations, Congress appropriated additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of dealing with COIN. Recent examples include the commander's emergency response program (CERP), the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Commander's Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction.⁶¹

During full spectrum operations, the military will need funding to jump-start the reconstruction effort. In late 2003, the Bush administration approved an \$18.4 billion supplemental allocation dedicated to improving Iraq's infrastructure; Afghanistan received a \$4 billion supplemental dedicated to infrastructure improvement.

Prior to these supplemental appropriations, CERP used captured Ba'athist party cash to repair emergency infrastructure such as electricity, water, and sewage. With captured Iraqi money, unit and DoD comptrollers and finance officers coordinated with ORHA and developed a Brigade Commander's Discretionary Recovery Program to directly benefit the Iraqi people by repairing essential services. In June 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formalized the program. Some legislators were concerned about potential misuse of CERP by coalition forces. According to Mark Martin, Deputy Legal Counsel, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff informed Congress that the commanders in the field would not misuse CERP and advised that the program must be free of the normal bureaucracy that is associated with appropriated funds.⁶² Congress acknowledged the need for commanders to have new and different non-kinetic tools to conduct stability operations. Although initially used by military forces, CERP is used today by civilians as well. However, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Funkhouser, commander of the 5th Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) during OIF I, stated that "CERP funds were inconsistent, resulting in the need to lay off workers due to lack of funds."⁶³ In November 2003, President Bush signed the CERP bill into law; this bill allowed federal appropriations to fund CERP projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2006 QDR states, "Recent efforts to build partnership capacity also highlight the importance of flexible access to funding through programs such as [CERP] ..."⁶⁴

Conclusion

This SRP repeatedly emphasizes such fundamental issues as security and employing the local indigenous population from the bottom-up. As the operational environment grows more stable, theater commanders can introduce interagency teams such as PRTs with the political objective of turning reconstruction projects over to civilian control. The reconstruction strategy formulation model in this SRP provides a way for civilian and military leaders to plan and execute reconstruction throughout the full spectrum of warfare. This model ties together the local (CERP), regional (CERP/PRT), and national (MIP) reconstruction efforts. One of the absolute conditions for transferring the reconstruction effort to civilian authority is security. Another condition is host nation sovereignty; as a new government is established, it must play a key role in reconstruction.

CERP has evolved as a bottom-up vehicle for reconstruction. It should be a model for future conflicts. We can expect that the infrastructure in areas such as Darfur in Western Sudan and Southern Lebanon will need rebuilding similar to that in Iraq and Afghanistan. CERP gives the commander an immediate non-lethal means to achieve "grass roots" political aims.

In today's global security environment, the U.S. capability to contain conflict will be determined significantly by the will of the American people. Middle Eastern regional security may be a long time coming. But the U.S. military forces can take the initial lead role and begin reconstruction in less secured areas. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples of the need for a bottom-up reconstruction policy that designates the military as the initial lead reconstruction agency, with the goal of transitioning the effort in a timely manner to civilian control. No two conflicts are alike. For example, PRTs have worked very well in Afghanistan, but thus far, have not achieved the same level of success in Iraq. General James Jones, commander of U.S. European Command, has observed how effectively the reconstruction mission and the international aid mission are focused. Fundamentally, this combined effort supports the exit strategy for Afghanistan.⁶⁵ Not only does full-spectrum bottom-up effects-based reconstruction support the Afghanistan exit strategy, but it will also support the exit strategy for future conflicts.

Endnotes

¹ MG Thomas P. Bostick, email message to author, 03 September 2006. MG Bostick is the former GRD Commander in OIF II. He deployed U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Area Engineer Offices in the Forward Operation Bases. Here after cited as Bostick.

² As the commander of the 14th Combat Engineer Battalion, the author executed over 30 CERP projects totaling \$3.2 million during OIF I. He saw first hand the significant bottom-up effects-based CERP projects had on the local community employment.

³ Tim Pritchard, "When Iraq Went Wrong," *New York Times*, 5 December 2006.

⁴ United States Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, DoD Directive 3000.05 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 28 November 2005), 1; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2007, 1. Here after cited as DoDD 3000.05.

⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁶ Greg Grant, "Tensions Builds in Iraq," *Government Executive* (December 2006): 23. Biddle went to say, "The piecemeal approach to reconstruction is a recurring theme of the entire U.S. enterprise in Iraq." Stephen Biddle is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former professor at the U.S. Army War College.

⁷ Dr. Condoleezza Rice, "Press Briefing," 4 April 2003; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030404-12.html>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007. Secretary Rice went to say, "The coalition will naturally have the leading role for a period of time to assure the provision of essential services to the Iraqi people. That action will require unity of effort. But, of course, the United Nations has expertise in many key areas, and the coalition will welcome its participation in postwar Iraq. Our goals are clear: We will help

Iraqis build an Iraq that is whole, free and at peace with itself and with its neighbors; an Iraq that is disarmed of all WMD; that no longer supports or harbors terror; that respect the rights of Iraqi people and the rule of law; and that is on the path to democracy.”

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 December 2006). “Essential services are defined as: security, water, electricity, academics, transportation networks, medical and sanitation (SWEAT-MS).” Here after cited as FM-3-24.

⁹ William Flavin, “Planning for Post Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003): 95-111. Colonel William Flavin (USA Ret.) is the Associate Professor of Peace Operations Concepts and Doctrine for the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. Before this assignment, he was a senior foreign affairs analyst with Booz Allen and Hamilton on contract to assist the Peacekeeping Institute for doctrine development.

¹⁰ Jamie Wilson, “Jordanian Embassy Blast Kills 11 in Baghdad,” *The Guardian*; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1014568,00.html>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of US forces in Iraq, was cited “The attack on the embassy was the “worst on a soft target” since Baghdad fell to American forces on April 9. But it was unclear last night who was responsible.”

¹¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Rebuilding Iraq, Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financial Challenges* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, February 2006); available from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06428t.pdf>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2007. “The United States faces three key challenges in rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. First, the security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and progressively draw down U.S. forces. The security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant increases in attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces. In addition, the security situation has affected the cost and schedule of rebuilding efforts.”

¹² Statement by Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 11 February 2003; available from http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Office_of_Reconstruction_and_Humanitarian_Assistance; Internet; accessed 12 February 2007. Feith stated that, “The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will fall upon the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, as the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in the field. The purpose of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is to develop the detailed plans that he and his subordinates will draw on in meeting these responsibilities.”

¹³ Marshall Adame, “Where There Is No Rule Of Law, There Is No Law And Order (Iraq in Chaos),” *American Chronicle* (18 January 2007); available from <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=19295>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2007. “In 2005 Adame was a Department of State U.S. Diplomatic Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) where he was on the staff of the National Coordination Team (NCT) in Baghdad. Adame cites “Having dissolved the existing Iraqi Army and displacing the thousands of Iraqi policemen, Paul Bremer started us all on this path to anarchy in Iraq. The Army and Police who had the institutional knowledge necessary to maintain any semblance of institutional and civil order, or stability were dismissed and disbanded by order Paul Bremer. In doing so, the Bush Administration unwittingly opened a

Pandora's box which, to this day, remains open and has filled Iraq with fear, death, poverty, hunger and strife."

¹⁴ CPT Daniel Cederman is on his second tour in Iraq. He has vast experience in bottom-up reconstruction. He is assigned to 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion and attached to 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, Tikrit, Iraq.

¹⁵ MG Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army and MAJ Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army, "Winning the Peace, The Requirement for Full spectrum Operations," *Military Review* 85 (July-August 2005): 10.

¹⁶ Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 30 June 2005), 2.

¹⁷ Richard B. Myers, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, March 2004), 4-6.

¹⁸ LTC Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations, Where Wars are Really Won," *Military Review*, 85 (May-June 2005); available from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_85/ai_n14695885; Internet; accessed 05 February 2007.

¹⁹ The Iraqi Study Group, *Iraqi Study Group Report* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2006), 12; available from http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf; Internet; accessed 08 March 2007.

²⁰ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 26 January 2007, referring to the new Iraq strategy and LTG David H. Petraeus, who was confirmed by the Senate to lead Multi-National Force-Iraq; available from <http://www.army.mil/>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2007.

²¹ Oscar DeSoto, "A New Approach to Preventing and Responding to Conflict," briefing slides, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 5-6.

²² DoDD 3000.05, 2. "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society."

²³ White House, *National Presidential Directive/NSPD-44* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 7 December 2005), 1; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>; Internet; accessed 8 March 2007, 1. Here after cited as NSPD-44. .

²⁴ Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-conflict Scenario*; (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 1-22; available from <https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB182.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 8 March 2007, 1-22,

²⁵ NSPD-41. "The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests."

²⁶ Association of the United States Army, *The U.S. Army's Role in Stability Operations*, Torchbearer National Security Report, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, October 2006), 4. Here after cited as Torchbearer.

²⁷ *Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq*, Defense Link; available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/postwar_iraq.htm; Internet; accessed 9 January 2007, 1. "DoD mid and senior-level planners and officials engaged in multiple planning initiatives for post-war contingencies. DoD staff in the theater and in Washington evaluated a wide-range of possible outcomes, led efforts to merge and synchronize planning from various government agencies, and shaped planning for the major combat phase of the operation to allow for the best possible post-war conditions. Key to DoD planning for this operation was the assumption that liberating Iraq from 35 years of tyrannical rule and severe social and economic underdevelopment would be a challenging prospect."

²⁸ Conrad and Terrill, v.

²⁹ U.S. State Department, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," available from www.state.gov/s/crs/; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

³⁰ Discussion between Oscar DeSoto, Director of Planning, S/CRS and COL Clarence D. Turner on 21 December. He agreed with my assessment that the Post-conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks List does not address infrastructure assessments and shaping that can take place during Phases 0-I.

³¹ U.S. State Department, "Marshall Plan," available from http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1946_cold_war/marshall_plan.html; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

³² Rowan Scarborough, "Rebuilding In Iraq Tops 4,000 Projects," *The Washington Times*, 20 November 2006; available from <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20061120-123520-8853r.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

³³ Ellen Knickmeyer and K.I. Ibrahim, "Bombing Shatters Mosque In Iraq, Attack on Shiite Shrine Sets Off Protests, Violence," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 23 February 2006; available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022200454.html>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2007. "Though no casualties were reported, the bombing was the most destructive attack on a major shrine since the U.S. invasion, and Iraqi leaders said it was meant to draw Shiites and Sunnis into war."

³⁴ Cederman. "A lot of money was wasted on projects that the Government will not maintain. This focuses primarily on Infrastructure projects that were finished without the consent of the Ministries. Therefore they have no budget to train the workers or maintain the facility."

Because of this the projects go into disrepair and the population becomes angry at us for giving them false hope. We have moved forward in the respect that we now push all projects through the Qada and Provincial level governments prior to executing them.”

³⁵ Yochi J. Dreazen and Greg Jaffe, “Bush Will Seek Aid, Jobs Funds To Bolster Iraq,” *Wall Street Journal*, 5 January 2007.

³⁶ “Rebuilding Iraq – The Contractors;” available from, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/rebuilding_iraq/index.asp; Internet; assessed 20 January 2007.

³⁷ Bostick.

³⁸ U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Fact Sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),” 14 November 2006; available from http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223_prt_fact_sheet.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2007. Here after cited as Fact Sheet.

³⁹ Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian–Military Relations in Afghanistan, available from http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/darfur/uploads/military/Military%20PRTs%20in%20Afghanistan_Sep04%20by%20SCUK.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.

⁴⁰ FM 3-24, 2-12.

⁴¹ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan—Lessons Identified* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, October 2005); available from <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/view/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=697> www.usip.org; Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.

⁴² U.S. Department of Defense, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan— An Interagency Assessment” (Sulfolk, VA: DoD Joint Center for Operational Analysis, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 26 April 2006), 11.

⁴³ Fact Sheet.

⁴⁴ Mandel. “Bush also said in his address on Iraq strategy that the United States would double the number of provincial reconstruction teams that provide joint military and civilian assistance to community projects. Rice said Thursday morning that the number of such teams would be increased from 10 to “at least 18.”

⁴⁵ Grant, 23. “Despite ‘some outstanding individual efforts,’ the PRT program has proved a failure, according to Stuart Bowen, special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction. An October report from the IG detailed numerous reasons: escalating violence, severe funding shortfalls, the inability of U.S. civilian and military personnel to work together, problems recruiting civilians willing to work in Iraq...”

⁴⁶ PRT Analysis, 1.

⁴⁷ Grant, 24.

⁴⁸ Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 12.

⁴⁹ FM 3-24, D-7.

⁵⁰ LTC Mark Martin, "No Small Change of Soldiering: The Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq and Afghanistan – CERP" *The Army Lawyer* (February 2004).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ LTC Stuart Risch and COL Clarence Turner discussed the effect-based strategic effects CERP gave the tactical commanders.

⁵⁴ Martin, 1.

⁵⁵ CPT Daniel Cederman was the Assistant Operations Officer for the 14th Combat Engineer Battalion during OIF I. He planned and led over 20 separate CERP projects.

⁵⁶ COL James I. Vosler, LTC Clarence D. Turner, and CPT Kevin J. Schrock, "Helping Iraqis Rebuild Iraq," *Army Engineer Association Magazine*, (July-September 2003), 4.

⁵⁷ COL Gary Pease and COL Clarence Turner discussed the use of U.S. Army Corps of Engineer resources from the bottom-up perspective. COL Gary Pease is a former G-3, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He also served in the Gulf Region Division in Iraq. According to Colonel Gary Pease, former G-3, United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), USACE Engineer Districts can also perform shaping operations during pre-conflict and deter phases

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, "Chairman's Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review," *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), A-4. Here after cited as QDR.

⁵⁹ Torchbearer, 14.

⁶⁰ DoDD 3000.05, 2.

⁶¹ FM 3-24, D-6.

⁶² Martin.

⁶³ COL Clarence Turner and Anthony Funkhouser had a discussion on CERP projects on 18 January 2007; they served in the same Task Force during OIF I. LTC Funkhouser commanded the 5th Combat Engineer Battalion.

⁶⁴ QDR, 17.

⁶⁵ Sharon Behn, "Reconstruction Seen Key To U.S. Exit," *Washington Times*, 6 October 2006; available from <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=Sharon+Behn%2C+%E2%80%9CReconstruction+Seen+Key+To+U.S.+Exit%2C%E2%80%9D+Washington+Times&btnG=Google+Search>; Internet; accessed 06 February 2006.

